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ABSTRACT 
The existence of spatial strategic interaction between neighbouring local governments is often referred 
in literature and identified in empirical applications for several countries. This interaction can occur 
either in expenditures or revenues of local governments. The spatial interaction in local government 
expenditure finds support on three theoretical explanations: spillover effects, Tiebout competition or 
mimicking behaviour. Identify the adequate explanation for the local government interaction is not an 
easy task since the reduced form of the estimated model can generate indistinguishable pattern in 
spatial interactions. This paper seeks to identify between those theoretical explanations what is the 
underlying reason for spatial interaction in public expenditures among local governments for the case 
of a particular sub-area of Portugal. Using differentiated model configurations and the local 
government expenditures of the municipalities composing the Northern Portuguese mainland, between 
1998 and 2008, the paper identifies the structural model that generates the observed spatial auto-
correlation in local public expenditures. Among the various theoretical reasons, only the existence of 
spillovers effects finds support. 
 
RESUMO 
A existência de interacção estratégica espacial entre governos locais vizinhos é muitas vezes referida 
na literatura e identificada nas aplicações empíricas relativas a diversos países. Essa interacção pode 
ocorrer tanto nas despesas ou nas receitas dos governos locais. A interacção espacial na despesa 
pública local encontra suporte em três explicações teóricas: efeitos externos, concorrência à Tiebout 
ou imitação no comportamento. Identificar a explicação adequada para a interacção entre governos 
locais não é uma tarefa fácil, já que a forma reduzida do modelo estimado pode gerar padrões 
indistinguíveis nas interacções espaciais. Este artigo procura identificar de entre as explicações 
teóricas qual a razão subjacente à interacção espacial nas despesas dos governos locais no caso de uma 
determinada subárea de Portugal. Usando diferenciadas configurações do modelo e as despesas dos 
governos locais dos municípios que compõem a região Norte do Continente Português, entre 1998 e 
2008, o artigo identifica o modelo estrutural que gera a observada autocorrelação espacial na despesa 
pública local. De entre as diversas razões teóricas apontadas, apenas a existência de efeitos externos 
encontra sustentação. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
International observation often identifies governments establishing relations that can have either a 
vertical or horizontal nature. Understand how these relations influence the local governmental 
decisions is the major goal of this paper. The focus is on horizontal interactions among local 
governments implying that the behaviour of neighbouring governments exercise reciprocal influences. 
The driven idea of the paper is to contribute for the discussion on how a process of spatial strategic 
interaction among neighbouring jurisdictions influences local governments’ decisions regarding public 
expenditures. The intuition behind strategic interaction is that politicians do not make their decisions 
in isolation, reacting often to decisions made by other politicians in the neighbouring jurisdictions. In 
this sense proximity plays a crucial role. The nearer are local governments from each other the higher 
is their reciprocal expected influence. 
Public finance literature
1
 recognizes the spatial dimension importance
2
. However, only recent 
advances in spatial data analysis have allowed an accurate consideration of space in the specification 
of models. The spatial dimension is usually introduced in the models by allowing a spatially lagged 
dependent variable or a spatially error term
3
 which rises some econometric problems like simultaneity 
due the endogeneity problem of the former and the violation of the basic OLS estimation assumption 
of uncorrelated errors of the latter. In this paper spatially lagged models are estimated since the goal is 
to identify the reason why local governments interact. 
There are three main theoretical approaches that explain the reasoning for spatial interaction among 
local governments: spillover effects, Tiebout (1956) competition or mimicking behaviour
4
. Briefly, the 
main driving forces are, respectively, the existence of unconditional grants from the central 
government used to support expenditures whose effects spread to neighbouring jurisdictions; an 
attempt to increase the tax base by attracting residents from a neighbouring jurisdiction and, an 
information spread about neighbouring incumbents’ performance that facilitates comparisons.  
Sometimes distinguish between those underlying reasons is a demanding task, especially when 
analysis only consider a specific year. The reasoning for that is the usually estimated reduced form of 
the spatial reaction function which is unable to identify the true reason for strategic interaction among 
local governments.
5
 To overcome those limitations an analysis using several years is required. 
Although, the panel data approach is not also conventional since the estimated equation have to deal 
with spatial correlation. 
Being aware of such difficulties the paper proposes to answer the question of what would be the 
reasoning behind local government expenditures pattern which appears to be related with neighbours’ 
behaviour. The empirical application is on the public expenditures of the Northern Portuguese local 
governments (municipalities). There are papers in the field that test strategic interaction among 
governments looking at local governments receipts. However, Portuguese municipalities have little 
influence on local government receipts, almost entirely defined by central government, benefiting, in 
contrast, from a relative freedom to set expenditures.  
Using data from the 86 municipalities composing the Northern region of Portugal mainland, between 
1998 and 2008, I test differentiated model configurations, using panel data estimations to answer the 
following questions: 1) Do the municipalities of the Northern region of Portugal establish a spatially 
strategic interaction? 2) If true, what is the main driven force? 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical explanations underlying the 
strategic interaction behaviour among local governments. Section 3 introduces the motivation for the 
paper. Section 4 systematises the main empirical questions and hypotheses to be tested. Empirical 
results are shown in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and identifies some resulting political implications. 
 
                                                          
1 Rosen (2008) is a reference book on the subject and is widely used in undergraduate classes. 
2 Gérard-Vared et al. (1997) discuss the importance of space for fiscal federalism theory. 
3 For an introduction of spatial error and spatial lag models see Anselin and Hudak (1992). 
4 For an introduction to this kind of public finance problems see Hillman (2003). 
5 For an extended discussion on this issue see Revelli (2005). 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Literature on spatial interaction identifies three explanations for a similar behaviour among local 
governments that are spatially close:  spillover effects, Tiebout competition or mimicking behaviour. 
Reviews of the state of the art of horizontal strategic interaction can be found in Brueckner (2003) and 
Epple and Nechyba (2004). 
The spillover effect occurs because some local government expenditures push (negative spillover) or 
constrain (positive spillover) the local public expenditures of the neighbours. The spillover effect can 
be due to a grant from central or European government to local governments that can be used to build 
a facility, a street for example, which crosses more than one jurisdiction. As a result, public 
expenditure will increase in more than one local government. In this case, providing local goods 
present complementary characteristics. If local goods evidence competing characteristics, however, for 
example the decrease in the quality of health care services, can make more attractive the services of a 
neighbouring jurisdiction, putting a pressure on the budget of local governments that offer better 
services, derived from the non-residents demand. The jurisdiction that reduced services quality, 
perceiving that individuals prefer the neighbouring service can decide to put the saved money with 
that service on other functions. 
When local governments correctly explore neighbouring synergies and work together in order to use 
public expenditures accurately, local public intervention enhances efficiency gains. Although 
competition among local governments being described as an advantage of fiscal federalism, it could 
also cause a negative effect
6
 in the case where competition leads to inefficient public goods provision. 
Local governments behaving as cooperators or as competitors depend crucially on ideology alignment 
among neighbouring governments. A more cooperative framework between neighbouring local 
governments tends to be identified when incumbency belongs to the same political party or is from the 
same ideology orientation. 
Under Tiebout competition, local governments interact in the attempt of attracting residents from a 
neighbouring jurisdiction, with the goal of improving the tax base. This local government behaviour is 
analogous to a fiscal competition, like the Tiebout mechanism, where people look at the advantageous 
emerging from public goods provided in several jurisdictions and select the better nearest option. By 
choosing with “their feet”, individuals opt for the jurisdiction that offers the public tax-expenditure 
bundle most adequate to their preferences. In this case, the number of new residents is the key for 
interactions that occur among local governments. The attraction of households improves building 
houses, thus leading to an increase in the number of residences. This kind of competition can be seen 
as welfare competition mechanism à Wildasin (1988). 
Spatial interaction can also be due to information spillover, which leads to a mimicking or copycat 
behaviour. The copycat behaviour is an application of the political yardstick competition hypothesis, 
introduced by Salmon (1987) and further developed by Besley and Case (1995), stated for tax settings, 
in which one jurisdiction interacts with fiscal policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. The reasoning for 
copying is that individuals get information about neighbouring incumbents’ performance. By 
comparing how local governments expend their budget, voters perceive the quality of their own local 
government, rewarding or punishing them in the election contest, according to the percept gap 
between incumbency activities. The likelihood of the local incumbents to be reappointed has also a 
meaning in the mimicking behaviour. A heavier copycat phenomenon faces a reasoning to exist as 
more fragile incumbency is. Majorities imply lower dependency from neighbours’ public budget 
management choices. 
 
3. MOTIVATION 
Portugal is known as a unitary state in which local governments have a reduced degree of freedom to 
set taxes. However, Portuguese municipalities benefit, in contrast, from a relative freedom to set 
                                                          
6 If neighbouring local governments take competitive behaviour too seriously, a phenomenon referred to in the literature as race to the 
bottom might be found (Brueckner, 2000; Saavedra, 2000). 
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expenditures. The main sources of local governments’ financing are property taxes or unconditional 
transfers from central government. Thus, the paper is concerned with the way local public 
expenditures decisions are influenced by neighbouring municipalities. 
Although widely studied in other countries, both on receipts and expenditures sides of local 
government budgets, the far as I know, Portuguese strategic interaction phenomena on public 
expenditures was only slightly analysed for the case of the municipalities composing the Algarve 
region, a small region with only 16 municipalities and the Southern part of Portugal, in Barreira 
(2010). Using differentiated model configurations of a spatial lagged model and a transformation 
referred by Debarsy and Ertur (2010) for estimating a fixed effects model, the paper identifies the 
structural model that generates the observed spatial auto-correlation in local public expenditures. The 
driven force identified for the existence of spatial strategic interaction among municipalities was the 
existence of spillover effects generated by grants from central government. Given the small scale of 
the previous analysis, this paper attempts to evaluate if the reason underlying spatial interaction among 
municipalities of the Algarve region can be generalized to the rest of the country or if each region, 
facing different realities, spatially interact by different reasons. 
The Northern region of Portugal is a very fractioned territory, as Table 1 shows. The region is 
composed of 8 sub-areas with differentiated characteristics as data indicates. Given the diversity of 
this region compared with the Algarve region, the paper evaluates if the predominant effect found for 
the Southern region of Portugal also finds support on the Northern region. 
 
Table 1 – Characteristics of the Northern region of Portugal 
 
Source: Portuguese National Statistics (I.N.E.) and own calculus. 
 
The spatial interaction estimation implies the definition of a neighbouring relationship which is 
represented by a matrix that measures connectivity among municipalities through a weighting 
attribution. Barreira (2010) considered a symmetric weighting matrix, implying a fixed number of 
neighbouring municipalities. When a differentiated number of neighbours are considered for each 
municipality, the estimation approach has to be reconsidered. The existence of a great interference of 
central government through unconditional transfers to local governments that generates a spillover 
effect was the main reason identified for the Southern part of the country to engage into spatial 
interaction. The question here is to evaluate if considering the referred differences for the North, the 
main reason for a spatial strategic interaction remains. Under these circumstances a different 
estimation procedure, namely an instrumental variable estimation, should be applied which can lead to 
different results regarding the reason underlying spatial strategic interaction. The estimations 
presented in section 5 answers to these questions.  
As international examples of the spatial strategic interaction study on local public expenditures, can be 
mentioned Case et al. (1993), Figlio et al. (1999) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) for U.S.; 
Schaltegger and Kuttel (2002) for Swiss; Solé-Ollé (2006) for Spain; Borck et al. (2007) for German; 
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Foucault et al. (2008) and Elhorst and Fréret (2009) for France; and St’astná (2009) for Czech 
Republic.  
Tiebout competition finds support in local governments from Germany and from the Czech Republic. 
In the former case, the financing of the local governments is sustained, in a relevant proportion, by 
mobile taxes, relying namely on enterprise activity. In this sense, more public expenditures means 
more public goods provided, making a jurisdiction more attractive for enterprises, since local 
governments offer them better conditions for their economic activity. In the latter case, Tiebout 
competition is found in the environmental expenditures with the goal of increasing the number of 
residents and consequently the tax base. Figlio et al. (1999), regarding the U.S. states, find that 
decentralized welfare benefit setting exacerbates inter-state competition that might induce states to 
respond to changes in their neighbour’ policies asymmetrically. 
The behaviour underlying municipal governments in France, in contrast, is imitation. France is usually 
considered a unitary country, meaning that decentralization processes are related to lower number of 
competencies attached to lower government levels, compared with Germany for example. In the case 
of Swiss cantons, mimicking effects in public expenditures is also found. The mimicking behaviour is 
also identified on part of US states by Fredriksson and Milimet (2002) in environmental policymaking. 
Spillover effects are found in Spanish local governments, meaning that local interactions elapse from 
an upper-level orientation: regional government. The same reasoning is identified by Case et al. 
(1993) for the U.S. case, in which expenditures on local public services potentially can cause 
beneficial or detrimental effects on nearby jurisdictions. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS 
4.1. Empirical framework 
The empirical application tests the existence of strategic interaction among local governments of 
Northern region of Portugal and intends to identify among the alternative theoretical explanations 
what is the underlying reason for that behaviour. The analyses consider the 86 municipalities 
composing the region and an observation period comprehended between 1998 and 2008. The spatial 
lag models estimated consider, as such, panel data. According to Hsiao (1986) and Baltagi (2005), 
panel data give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more 
degrees of freedom, and more efficiency. Panel data also allows the specification of more complicated 
behavioural hypothesis, including effects that cannot be addressed using pure cross-sectional or time-
series data. In the spatial models allow to identify the underlying reason behind spatial strategic 
interaction, which would be not possible under a cross-section framework. 
For the weighting matrix definition all municipalities bordering each municipality were considered, 
implying an asymmetric matrix which allows a differentiated number of neighbours. In fact, the region 
has municipalities comprehending from 2 to 9 neighbouring municipalities. According to Anselin et 
al. (2006) weights choice is typically driven by geographic criteria, such as contiguity or distance, 
including nearest neighbour distance. The weighting matrix is row-normalized, meaning that sums 
one. 
The cost of ignoring spatial dependence in the dependent variable is relatively high since the 
econometrics literature has pointed out that if one or more relevant explanatory variables are omitted 
from a regression equation, the estimator of the coefficients for the remaining variables is biased and 
inconsistent (Greene, 2005). In contrast, ignoring spatial dependence in the disturbances, if present, 
which leads to spatial error model estimation, approach discarded here, will only cause a loss of 
efficiency. 
Spatial models rely on the asymptotics in the cross-sectional dimension to obtain consistency and 
asymptotic normality of estimators. Models with controls for fixed effects utilize the time-series 
component of the data, whereas models without controls for spatial fixed effects utilize the cross-
sectional component of the data. Some studies argue that models that control for spatial fixed effects 
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tend to give short-term estimates and models without controls for spatial fixed effects tend to give 
long-term estimates (Baltagi, 2005, Paltridge, 2005). 
Consistent estimation of the individual fixed effects is not possible when N tends to infinity, due to the 
incidental parameter problem (Anselin, 2001). The incidental parameters problem is independent of 
the extension to spatial error autocorrelation or to the inclusion of a spatially lagged dependent 
variable since it also occurs without these two extensions. The spatial fixed effects can only be 
estimated consistently when T is sufficient large (Elhorst, 2010a). Nevertheless, it has been argued 
that when the interest it is primarily in obtaining consistent estimates for the coefficient of the 
dependent variables, the use of demeaned spatial regression models may be appropriate using the 
standard maximum likelihood (ML) estimation approach (Elhorst, 2003).  
As an alternative to reliance on an often unrealistic assumption of normality and to avoid some of the 
computational problems associated with the Jacobian term in ML estimation, Instrumental Variables 
(IV) and General Method Moments (GMM) methods has been suggested for single cross-section 
spatial regression models (Anselin, 1988 and 1990, Kelejian and Prucha, 1998 and 1999). According 
to Anselin et al. (2006) these results can be extended to the panel data setting. The endogeneity of the 
spatially lagged dependent variable suggests a straightforward instrumental variables strategy in which 
the spatially lagged (exogenous) explanatory variables are used as instruments (Kelejian and Prucha, 
1998 and Lee, 2003). 
Under the presence of spatially lagged dependent variable, the pool OLS (POLS) estimated parameters 
lose its property of unbiasedness and consistency. The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is 
applicable when T is large and N is small, which is not the case here. As an alternative, Elhorst (2001) 
suggests the IV estimation by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), but this method does not take account 
of the restrictions on the coefficients within the coefficients matrices.   The advantage of this method 
is that they do not rely on the assumption of normality of the disturbances and ignores the Jacobian 
term (Elhorst, 2010b). The author also states that the IV estimation assumes that the disturbances 
terms are independently and identically distributed for all i and t with zero mean and variance sigma 
square (Elhorst, 2010a). Moreover, IV estimation has the benefit of proving consistent estimates of the 
parameters even in the presence of spatially correlated error terms (Saavedra, 2000). One disadvantage 
of IV estimators is the possibility of ending up with a coefficient estimate of the spatial lag coefficient 
outside its parameter space by the fact of ignoring the Jacobian term. 
Fingleton and Le Gallo (2007, 2008) show that IV estimators are extremely useful in those cases 
where linear spatial dependence models contain one or more endogenous explanatory variables that 
need to be instrumented. Models including a spatial lag and additional endogenous variables can be 
straightforwardly estimated by 2SLS. Franzese and Hays (2004) states that spatial 2SLS-IV, which 
instruments for spatial lags of dependent variables with spatial lags of independent variables, yields 
unbiased and reasonably efficient estimates of both common-stimuli and diffusion effects, when its 
conditions hold: large samples and fully exogenous instruments. If the instruments are indeed perfectly 
exogenous, their covariances with errors is exactly zero, then IV estimators will be consistent and 
asymptotic efficient (Franzese and Hays, 2007). 
Given that the cross-section dimension largely exceeds the time dimension and in order to avoid the 
incidental problem refereed above, spatial lagged models without controls for spatial fixed effects are 
estimated. Estimations rely on the 2SLS using as instruments the lagged common dependent variables. 
 
4.2. Empirical hypothesis 
The dependent variable is per capita public expenditure (pubexp). The independent variables are, 
beside neighbouring per capita public expenditures (Wpubexp) – the spatial lagged variable, two 
economic variables, namely, the percentage of property taxes on receipts (proptax) and medium value 
for residence (valueres). 
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The observations are converted into natural logarithmic, allowing the reading of the ro-coefficient, 
associated to the neighbour effects, as elasticity. Seeking for simplicity, I dropped the indices i for 
each of the 86 municipalities and t for each of 11 years included in the panel data estimations. 
The basic model follows a spatial lag specification and can be defined as: 
exp ( exp)pub c Wpub X       
The identification of the reason underlying a statistical significant ro-coefficient, the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient, implies the configuration of three hypotheses to be tested related to each 
one of the possible explanation for strategic interaction among local governments typified above. 
H1: Strategic interaction is a spillover effect overcome 
If the hypothesis is correct when central government grants as well as ideology alignment with 
neighbouring local governments are considered, the statistical significance of ro-coefficient should 
decrease. 
The basic model is extended to check this hypothesis including two more independent variables: 
grants from central government (transfac) and ideology alignment with neighbouring jurisdictions 
(ideolalig). 
1exp ( exp)pub c Wpub X Z         
H2: Strategic interaction is a result of Tiebout competition 
Under this hypothesis the relevant variable that explains why local governments are tempted to get 
into strategic interaction is the number of residences available in each jurisdiction, being the goal of 
each local government to increase houses, thus attracting tax contributors to own jurisdiction. The 
inclusion of a variable that captures this effect should produce a decrease on the statistical significance 
of the ro-coefficient. 
In this case the basic model is changed to accomplish one more independent variable – number of 
houses for residence (house) and becomes as: 
2exp ( exp)pub c Wpub X Y         
H3: Mimicking behaviour is the reasoning for strategic competition 
Political circumstances play a crucial role when this hypothesis is tested. In fact copycat behaviour is 
more heavily expected by local governments facing reappointment problems. As such, an electoral 
year is determinant for this behaviour because comparisons between local incumbents can become 
with a cost: electoral defeat. Moreover, making public expenditure choices under majority or minority 
political frameworks determine the temptation for mimicking. If local governments have majorities are 
less constrained by neighbours’ public expenditures choices. 
In order to accommodate this explanation the basic model is extended with three dummy variables: 
Chamber Majority (chambmaj), Municipal Assembly Majority (assebmaj) and election year 
(electiony), which occurred in 2001 and 2005. The resulting estimated model is defined as: 
3exp ( exp)pub c Wpub X Q         
Table 2 summarises the main statistics for the independent variable, the lagged independent variable, 
the dependent variables and the lagged dependent variables used as instruments. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
I started with a non-spatial linear regression model and then tested whether or not the model needs to 
be extended with spatial interaction effects, as suggested by Elhorst (2010b). The POLS estimates 
accuracy improves significantly with the inclusion of the spatially lagged variable. Since under the 
presence of spatially lagged dependent variable, the pool OLS (POLS) estimated parameters lose its 
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property of unbiasedness and consistency, I consider the estimation of 2SLS models using as 
instruments the lagged dependent variables common to all estimates. I also confirmed that the 
covariances between lagged dependent variables considered as instruments and the errors of the 
estimations are approximately equal to zero. 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, independent variables and instruments 
 
Source: Portuguese National Statistics (I.N.E.) and own calculus. 
 
Table 3 shows the main empirical results. The basic model identifies the presence of strategic 
interaction among neighbouring municipalities, since ro-coefficient is statistical significant. When the 
model is extended to accommodate the three hypotheses tested, only the hypothesis 1 is relevant.  
For the Northern region of Portugal, spatial strategic interaction among neighbouring municipalities 
emerges as a result of spillover effects. For this effect the relevant variable is the alignment of 
ideology among neighbouring municipalities. In fact, neighbouring municipalities that share the same 
ideology tend to spend more, meaning that bordering municipalities with incumbency of the same 
party are more prone to engage into cooperation that leads to an increase on public expenditures. The 
example of a street that crosses more than one municipality can be seen as a good example. In this 
case, a rehabilitation intervention by one municipality of inter-jurisdictional street forces to a 
rehabilitation of the part located in the neighbouring municipalities and this effect is improved when 
incumbencies share the same ideology. 
The existence of central government grants to local governments, although forcing an increase on 
public expenditures, has a smaller relevance than the ideology alignment among neighbouring 
municipalities. This result is somehow unexpected since the former study for the southern part of 
Portugal identified as the major reason for spillover effects the existence of such transfers. 
The second hypothesis does not find support. Although the variable number of new houses is 
statistically relevant has a negative sign, contrarily to the initial expectation. This could be explained 
by the fact that in the Northern region there is 24 very small municipalities with less than 10 000 
inhabitants. Moreover, 42 municipalities (almost fifty percent of the considered municipalities) are 
facing shrinking phenomena during the last decade, thus do not being economically attractive 
municipalities. As consequence, the number of new houses built has been decreasing when public 
expenditure per capita increases due the reduction of inhabitants. 
Mean
Standard 
deviation
Maximum Minimum
pubexp 650 359 2668 70
Wpubexp 543 265 1630 105
valueres 36.961 27.109 218.776 3.876
proptax 11,34 9,21 51,04 0,00
transfac 48,79 16,49 86,94 3,69
ideolalig 0,44 0,28 1,00 0,00
house 346 604 5903 3
chambmaj 0,95 0,22 1,00 0,00
assebmaj 0,70 0,46 1,00 0,00
electy 0,18 0,39 1,00 0,00
wproptax 13,20 8,93 79,85 1,19
wvalueres 35.945 23.127 149.500 4.213
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Table 3: Estimation 2SLS of public expenditures with intercept and common lagged dependent variables as instruments 
T-values: *1% statistical significant; **5% statistical significant; ***10% statistical significant. Intercept value is not reported.
Basic Model t-stat
Model testing 
H1
t-stat
Model testing 
H2
t-stat
Model testing 
H3
t-stat
Extended 
Model
t-stat
wpubexp 0.509958 13,871230 * 0.479971 12,651230 * 0.464798 12,695850 * 0.511668 13,637170 * 0.432379 11,165980 *
valueres 0.223745 5,939986 * 0.248952 6,549076 * 0.237017 6,457521 * 0.216729 5,621920 * 0.248220 6,521214 *
proptax -0.475474 -13,293600 * -0.468731 -12,211350 * -0.369991 -9,401485 * -0.460944 -12,638730 * -0.346168 -8,126450 *
transfac 0.074428 1,500497 *** 0.063970 1,317392 ***
ideolalig 0.184747 3,345563 * 0.166179 3,031219 *
house -0.095997 -5,729445 * -0.098597 -5,850474 *
chambmaj 0.079310 1,001022 0.088255 1,141604
assembmaj 0.057699 1,517742 *** 0.046941 1,259011
electy -0.021657 -0,21807 0.058286 0,600609
Robustness Tests p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
Wald test (ρ=0) 192,411 0.0000 * 160,054 0.0000 * 161,185 0.0000 * 185,973 0.0000 * 124,679 0.0000 *
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Moreover, it seems that local governments increase per capita public expenditures in an attempt to 
refrain the abandon of the municipalities. In these circumstances, spatial strategic interaction is not an 
outcome of a Tiebout competition phenomenon. 
Municipalities also can spatially interact as a Tiebout competition mechanism not for inhabitants 
directly but for economic activity – enterprises. However, when the number of enterprises is 
considered instead of number of new houses, the effect is reinforced.
7
 In fact, the decreasing number 
of enterprises in a municipality forces local government to engage into more spending, trying probably 
to avoid the abandon of inhabitants. Consequently, local governments act replacing the place taken by 
enterprises, namely substituting them as a major employer. In this framework, it seems that equity 
concerns overcome the efficiency questions. 
The third hypothesis tested of a mimicking behaviour underlying strategic interaction among 
municipalities did not also find support.  The fair of being compared with neighbouring municipalities 
performance prior elections seems not explain incumbents engaging in spatially strategic interaction. 
This result is confirmed when specific public expenditure categories are considered, namely 
environmental management and protection or cultural and sportive expenditures.
8
 Although mimicking 
behaviour would be more easily observed, according to the literature, when particular public 
expenditures are considered, the estimates do not sustain this prior expected result. 
When spending on environmental management and protection is considered as independent variable 
the spatially strategic interaction becomes less intense. Spatially strategic interaction in this kind of 
public expenditure result also from a spillover effect which emerges by neighbouring local 
governments engage into a cooperative behaviour when incumbency have the same ideology 
orientation. The increasing dependency from central government grants reveals influence negatively 
public expenditures on environmental management and protection, which is in contrast with the 
expectations. Tiebout competition also does not find support when this category of public expenditure 
is taken as independent variable. Although not shown, municipalities with few enterprises tend to 
spend more on environment. 
Similar results are found when the analysis considers cultural and sportive expenditures. The major 
difference relies on Tiebout competition which sums to the spillover effect. In this case, the increasing 
of new residences influences positively this kind of public expenditures, reinforcing the spatially 
strategic interaction. This result means that local governments use this category of public expenditures 
to attract new residents to their municipalities. The economic activity seems do not play a relevant role 
for the decision of this type of expenditures. 
The estimates indicate that per capita public expenditure increases with the value of houses, meaning 
that differences in fiscal attractiveness tend to be capitalised into house prices, and decrease with the 
proportion of property taxes on public budget, as theory predicts  since the higher the voters 
contributions the more accountable the incumbents become. These results are irrespective of being 
considered as independent variable particular categories or overall public expenditures. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Using differentiated model configurations and the local government expenditures of the municipalities 
composing the Northern region of Portugal, between 1998 and 2008, the paper identifies the structural 
model that generates the observed spatial auto-correlation in local public expenditures. Strategic 
interaction among municipalities is an outcome of spillover effects stimulated by neighbouring local 
governments with similar political orientation. The confirmed spillover effect hypothesis reinforces 
the idea that public expenditure in a municipality induces more expenditure in neighbouring 
municipalities. For this part of the country is not reasonable to state that public expenditure increase 
by a copycat incentive or as a strategy to competitively attract more residents, increasing, as such, tax 
base. 
                                                          
7 The estimative considering the number of enterprises are not shown here but are available upon request. 
8
 The Appendix presents the descriptive statistics relative to these variables as well as the estimations outputs when they are considered as 
dependent variables. 
10 
 
In Portugal, municipalities have a large spectrum of competences irrespectively of their dimension. 
Given the delegation by central government of too many public functions to be fulfilled, 
municipalities tend to replicate the same local public goods in each municipality, thus do not 
exploiting scale economies and leading to a replication of public goods or an overwhelming provision. 
This public expenditure increase due spillover effects is not an outcome of a copycat behaviour but a 
result of the same range of competences delegation to all municipalities, irrespectively of their 
budgetary capacity. Good examples are roads intervention or education investment on better schools to 
improve educational quality. 
These results deserve some reflexion. Being local governments influenced by central government, 
incumbents are pushed to offer to own population a wide set of public goods, covering a huge number 
of economic and social functions. Moreover, the reliance on intergovernmental grants for financing 
local governments’ activity has a pervasive effect, since it destroys the right incentive for responsible 
local decisions and compromises autonomy, thereby allowing the intrusion, although indirectly, of the 
central government into local decisions.  
Given the necessity of accomplishing the competences attached to municipalities, public provision 
tend to be homogenous making irrelevant the “vote with the feet” mechanism promoted by Tiebout. 
Similarly, if all municipalities offer the same public goods set the inter-jurisdictional comparison of 
the incumbency performance loses its reasoning. If we sum also the fact that local governments have a 
very slight margin to set taxes, constrained to a small gap for defining the tax rate of local taxes, no 
mechanism enhancing efficiency gains that would limit public expenditure can be found. 
Since local governments are not free to chose what set of competences should be fulfilled, 
municipalities are not allowed to specialize on certain public functions or exploit scale agglomeration 
gains. As such, local governments are not compelled to give voice to their constituents, meaning that 
specific local preferences for public goods are not fully considered, leading, by one hand, to market 
imperfections and, by the other hand, to an inefficient public provision with implications on local and 
regional development. 
Given the small dimension of too many municipalities in the Northern region of Portugal, the number 
of municipalities should be evaluated, as it was recently in other countries like Finland or Greece, 
leading to the possibility of merging municipalities, thus avoiding unnecessary public expenditures, 
exploiting the gains from agglomeration and reducing the cost of facilities replication. 
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APPENDIX:  
 
Table A1 – Descriptive statistics of environmental management and protection and cultural and sportive expenditures 
considered as alternative dependent variables 
 
Source: Portuguese National Statistics (I.N.E.) and own calculus. 
Mean
Standard 
deviation
Maximum Minimum
envprotexp 44 29 234 0
wenvprotexp 42 24 354 3
cultsprtexp 80 65 458 0
wcultsprtexp 75 39 315 14
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Table A2: Estimation 2SLS of environmental management and protection expenditures with intercept and common lagged dependent variables as instruments 
 
 T-values: *1% statistical significant; **5% statistical significant; ***10% statistical significant. Intercept value is not reported.
Basic Model t-stat
Model testing 
H1
t-stat
Model testing 
H2
t-stat
Model testing 
H3
t-stat
Extended 
Model
t-stat
wenvprotexp 0.384498 5,405356 * 0.381554 5,361853 * 0.384349 5,400273 * 0.377009 5,196101 * 0.377896 5,199600 *
valueres 0.398817 5,686558 * 0.416842 5,879677 * 0.398521 5,677498 * 0.407217 5,629655 * 0.424525 5,785613 *
proptax -0.397895 -6,291818 * -0.505363 -7,093799 * -0.404009 -5,371437 * -0.395813 -6,076586 * -0.499131 -6,009486 *
transfac -0.275714 -3,026095 * -0.266505 -2,889354 *
ideolalig 0.250995 2,417360 * 0.240412 2,264848 *
house 0.004756 0,150321 -0.003069 -0,095840
chambmaj -0.114399 -0.765507 -0.113093 -0,750625
assembmaj 0.118754 1,653584 ** 0.081399 1,119173
electy 0.011075 0,059630 0.015678 0,084116
Robustness Tests p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
Wald test (ρ=0) 29,2179 0.0000 * 28,7495 0.0000 * 29,1630 0.0000 * 26,9995 0.0000 * 27,0358 0.0000 *
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Table A3: Estimation 2SLS of cultural and sportive expenditures with intercept and common lagged dependent variables as instruments 
 
 T-values: *1% statistical significant; **5% statistical significant; ***10% statistical significant. Intercept value is not reported.  
Basic Model t-stat
Model testing 
H1
t-stat
Model testing 
H2
t-stat
Model testing 
H3
t-stat
Extended 
Model
t-stat
wcultsprtexp 0.441477 7,703455 * 0.434165 7,390549 * 0.469332 7,842567 * 0.435779 7,577527 * 0.455827 7,411477 *
valueres 0.385746 5,842513 * 0.410094 6,076384 * 0.372775 5,585274 * 0.373735 5,526261 * 0.387711 5,546003 *
proptax -0.434687 -7,205798 * -0.500405 -7,571460 * -0.487781 -7,154993 * -0.415488 -6,716710 * -0.528313 -7,039850 *
transfac -0.148591 -1,789811 ** -0.139340 -1,659328 **
ideolalig 0.256897 2,718254 * 0.233735 2,418696 *
house 0.050432 1,698048 ** 0.043181 1,436908 ***
chambmaj 0.129261 0,965551 0.105007 0,773543
assembmaj 0.061695 0,958728 0.030837 0,470336
electy 0.020483 0,123955 -0.001027 -0,006146
Robustness Tests p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
Wald test (ρ=0) 59,3432 0.0000 * 54,6202 0.0000 * 61,5059 0.0000 * 57,4189 0.0000 * 54,9300 0.0000 *
